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Lacanian theory maintains that the “object” of psychoanalysis is that 
which one is never without. Put another way, the “object” is actually not 
an object at all: it is the objet petit a, which is the cause of the subject’s 
desire. Lacan was fond of the following expression: “anxiety is not without 
an object.” Lacan was an anti-philosopher. As such, he has a different 
point of departure than Daniel Colson, the philosopher. Lacan offers us an 
alternative to the sort of “object” offered to us by Daniel Colson and Jesse 
Cohn in their little dictionary of anarchist philosophy. For Lacan, the objet 
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petit a resists symbolization. As a product of this resistance it gives rise to 
fantasies within the imaginary. The object therefore radically resists in-
corp-oration into the body of knowledge. This explains why the objet a is 
so important for the clinical treatment of body-events such as nervous 
ticks, headaches, muscle tremors, nail biting, and so on: it is a rupture 
within the body revealed, in a form which is devoid of any authentic 
knowledge or meaning, as a symptom. Colson’s “object” may indeed be 
more comforting, but it is, for that reason, much more symptomatic. 
The object for psychoanalysis is never comfortable. It is an uneasy 
object that can never be made use of and which inevitably repeats itself 
within discourse, thereby producing tremendous anxiety: “anxiety is not 
without an object” (Lacan, January 30th, 1963). When one confronts the 
object in this way it cannot but produce a certain degree of anxiety in the 
subject. Thus, it is not that one has or makes use of an object for diverse 
purposes, as the philosopher does, and it is not that one is without an 
object – as the atheist or nihilist claims (because this would imply a 
simple and naïve negation of the object (e.g., this is the way many anti-
Lacanian commentators describe “lack”) – it is not that we are simply 
forever in search of some object to fill out the lack-in-being. Rather, any 
object at hand is already in the here-and-now fundamentally lacking. 
Things are therefore simultaneously much more obscure and much more 
precise: the subject is not without an object because the object resists. 
And is this not what Max Stirner meant when in his short essay on “Art & 
Philosophy” he wrote: “art makes the object, and religion lives only in its 
many ties to that object, but philosophy very clearly [..] places its 
pulverizing hand upon all the business of making objects […] and so 
breathes the air of freedom.” Stirner is here articulating an “object” which 
may be destroyed – certainly not the object that one is never without – 
and yet, why? Because he was in search of an alternative to the object-
making enterprises of philosophers!  
Consider, for the moment, the object as defined by many of today’s 
naïve philosophers. It is clear that here Lacan is not an atheist like Stirner 
and yet neither is he a philosopher: he is, as Alain Badiou put very well 
during his famous 1990s Lacanian seminars, an “anti-philosopher.” Lacan 
seemed to have reduced the philosopher’s discourse to the desire for 
mastery. The philosopher builds grand conceptual systems that appear at 
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once to make a pretense at having the definitive dictionary on truth. Thus, 
the structure of the philosopher’s discourse is akin to what Lacan named 
“university discourse” because it locates truth not as a “half-saying” but 
rather as an attempt to “say it all” or “have the last word” on truth – like any 
dictionary. Indeed, it is from the attempt to impose a meta-language that 
it, like Colson’s book, provides a definition even for the word “definition.”  
No wonder the main place to go today to understand anarchist theory is 
none other than the university. Indeed, I, myself, have profited immensely 
from anarchist scholarship within the university. However, such a 
discourse constructs revolutionary statements only by reinventing the 
discourse of mastery: the anarchist who wishes to surpass the latter 
discourse, as all anarchists profess to do, should interrogate what within 
their own discourse gives rise to more ingenious forms of mastery. It is 
not only or exclusively an examination of so-called “micro-fascisms,” so 
fetishized by anarchists these days, but also, and more brutally, an 
examination of the “micro-anarchist” affirmations which give rise, 
unconsciously, to new and more insidious forms of fascism. 
For this reason, I became interested (after decades of anarchist 
work) in Lacanian psychoanalysis. Lacan put the problem of ‘revolution’ in 
no uncertain terms: “the master’s discourse has only one counterpoint, 
the analytic discourse.”  Whereas the master’s discourse is structured so 
that it may be propelled by a single meaningless (nonsensical) signifier, 
the analytic discourse attempts tirelessly to dislodge the discourse of 
mastery by exposing it as a primordial decisional structure of discourse 
as such. The master discourse propels only a signifier, such as, 
“Definition” (see Colson, 2019: 66). In other words, the master signifier, 
denoted in Lacanese as S1, is, in this example, “Definition.” The top 
formula of the master’s discourse reads: S1  S2. This implies that the 
signifier gives rise to a response, what we denote with S2, typically from 
the subjected student/professor who does the difficult and rigorous work 
of coming to define the concept. 
The student/professor proposes something like the following 
definition, for “Definition:” “[i]n libertarian thought, the definition is opposed 
to the concept” (Colson, 2019: 66). In place of the master discourse, the 
student/professor provides a system of meaning, which, by all conscious 
measures, attempts (inadequately) to triumph over the master signifier or 
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discourse. We might write this in the following way: S2  a, whereby the 
student, from the place of knowledge, seeks to integrate into a consistent 
dictionary of knowledge that which has not yet been known, objet petit a. 
It is striking, then, that Colson’s definition of “Definition” is written as 
follows: 
Whereas the concept emerges from the midst of things in order 
to bring to light and express focal points of meaning […] the 
definition […] always attempts to fix things within pre-established 
limits, within a reductive and oppressive order. In place of the 
definition, libertarian thought affirms the indefinite, the 
unspecified, […] and conditions of a new world can emerge 
(Colson, 2019: 66). 
The “focal points” of meaning are similar to S1s. Colson mistakenly 
understands them as “concepts,” which, through their ‘quilting effects,’ 
give rise to any discourse at all (whether university, hysterical, or master). 
It is the indefinite object, which is almost certainly the objet petit a, which 
gets put to work for the “new world” of knowledge where S2  a. How are 
we to escape from this endless recuperation of the object? It is first 
important that we recognize that it is a structure of discourse, a discourse 
which repeats its structure throughout each and all of its statements, and 
from which, for the subject of that discourse, there is no possible escape. 
The analytic discourse, on the other hand, introduces an essential 
provocation; the analyst is neither master nor student, but exists only in 
the role of objet petit a. The analyst succeeds by embodying the objet 
petit a of the analysand’s discourse and reflecting it back upon the 
subject.  
Returning to the formula of university discourse: a line separates 
the conscious articulation of the discourse from its repressed or 
unconscious determinations. The full formula of university discourse may 
be written as S2/S1  a/$. Beneath the slash – S1 and $ -- indicate an 
unconscious truth and a product of the discourse, respectively. The truth 
of the discourse is that it is still nonetheless structured and anchored to 
another discourse, the master’s discourse (S1). This is why, in Lacan’s 
seminar … Or Worse, he maintained, repeatedly, that every discourse only 
exists in relation to another discourse. Colson’s definition of “Definition” – 
“the conditions of a new world can emerge …” – clearly demonstrates that 
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the subject wants to know nothing of its unconscious determinations, it 
wants only to affirm, and to affirm a knowledge which is not at all a 
knowledge of the unconscious determinations of those affirmations. 
Finally, what is produced is not at all a “new world” but rather new forms 
of intellectual subjection, $. So afraid is the university anarchist afraid of 
expressing this truth that he returns endlessly to the cycle which 
compelled his discourse in the first place: ‘post-anarchists have 
recuperated our ideas into the establishment of the university! They do 
not know what we know about anarchism!’ The field of ‘anarchist studies,’ 
therefore, strives always, and impossibly, toward a coherent organization 
of S2 through appeals to ever more inclusions, every more voices, ever 
more knowledges.  
This is why Jesse Cohn’s introduction to Daniel Colson’s A Little 
Philosophical Lexicon of Anarchism From Proudhon to Deleuze is 
perhaps the most essential and important references for understanding 
the discourse of contemporary anarchist studies today. Cohn praises the 
“translational” strategies of anarchists and invites each reader to translate 
in their own way the indefinite objet a into their own symptomatic 
fantasies: “[m]ay it be a useful tool [object] in your hands. May it modify 
you – and may you modify it” (Cohn in Colson, 2019: 18). It is an invitation 
to bring the objet a into circulation so that it might contribute to the 
development of ever more novel translations, and yet who is the subject 
of such an effort? It is the very figure Cohn and Colson wished to avoid: 
the “monad.” The monad, a figure with “neither doors nor windows,” gives 
rise to a “neo-monadological” figure who is somehow able to find a “door” 
or a “window” precisely by manufacturing more “objects” and “tools.” Yet 
these objects are not transparent, like the objet petit a, they are clouded in 
ink: consistent, accessible, translatable, orientable objects. Cohn writes: 
Rather than seeking to transcend differences in the overarching 
unity of the ‘universal’ or to reduce all struggles to a single 
category (class, gender, race, ecology, etc), forces engaged in 
social struggles can link up with one another, […] (Cohn in 
Colson, 2019: 8). 
We should ask ourselves a very important question: what exactly 
constitutes ‘difference’? Colson’s response is unequivocal: “anarchism 
(from Stirner to Bakunin) affirms the absolute singularity of beings” 
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(Colson, 2019: 66). Colson recognizes “difference” as a multiplicity which 
exceeds the “police order,” and this, precisely, is reminiscent also of 
Jacques Ranciere’s multiplicities as “non-parts.” However, on this point, it 
seems to me, we have recourse to one of two very clear answers: first, we 
might understand by “difference” or “multiplicity” an assortment of 
singular “ones” or “atoms,” or, if you like, “monads.” In this case, each 
individual monad is a one onto itself which, through a so-called 
“transversal of ones” which form a multiplicity that we may properly name 
a “group” or “collective.” For Colson, this is the only possibility of solidarity. 
But there is a second possibility: “difference” might be understood in a 
more Badiouian way as “differences of differences” or as “multiplicities of 
multiplicities,” or “pure multiplicities.”  
           To be very clear, I share with Cohn & Colson – as well as Shawn 
Wilbur and a number of other critics of “post-anarchism” – an aversion to 
the typical and naïve solution which posits hegemonic “universalism” as 
the only solution for revolutionary solidarity and struggle. In this 
problematic account, a single concept, whether it is “class,” “gender,” or 
“race,” gets sole epistemological priority over any definition, S2. In other 
words, I agree that the “hegemonic” universality of the “concept” is not the 
way forward for revolution praxis, and I agree that many of the 
interpretations of Marxism which have forced this universality are simply 
inadmissible. It is even possible that this was the very point of the split 
that occurred, or, rather, intervention, that occurred within the 
International between the Marxists and the anarchists: the anarchists 
here took up the analytic discourse and demonstrated to the Marxists 
their lust for power. We might even maintain, as most anarchists do by 
necessity, that the state and revolutionary part can never adequately 
represent the interests of its people or public (e.g., its multiplicities). 
However, here we should be careful not to return to the naïve multiplicity 
of monads or ‘ones’ which animate most populist discourse today. 
In any case, this does not at all mean that we need to abandon the 
concept of universality. Indeed, it is the anti-postanarchists who are here 
the true relativists or subjectivists for refusing to engage with the 
determinations of their discourse: neo-monadology is here only another 
attempt to renew the monad by drawing new walls, by locking new 
doors, that is, by imprisoning oneself within the prison-cell of S2s. Against 
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the neo-monadology of consistent multiplicities – which are, within 
capitalist discourse, nothing but commodities or “lathouses” – we should 
affirm a new revolutionary universality against the consistency of 
differences that make up the dictionaries of the neoliberal university. The 
definition will not rise up against the concept as expected because it is 
anchored to it, oriented by it, rotating around it like an inmate around the 
center of his cell. The concept should here be redefined as that which 
gives rise to the ‘empty form’ within any monad, within any definition, and 
which, precisely through this ‘empty form’ exposes not the indefiniteness 
of the object but rather the infinity of the real. Put another way, there is a 
universality that may be shared but it is not through the manufacturing of 
definitions and objects: it is through the sharing of lack itself. 
As anarchists, then, we should affirm a new revolutionary love 
which takes the Lacanian axiom of castration as its affirmation: “love is 
giving what you do not have.” This might be counter-posed to the other 
infamous statement on love declared by Lacan: “love is what makes up 
for the lack of a relationship.” We might retranslate this in our own way as 
follows: (1) love is what makes up for the lack of an object, and (2) love is 
giving what you do not have, the sharing of lack. Cohn & Colson are here 
sharing with us precisely what they have got, an object of knowledge: 
they make up for the lack of an object (castration). On the other hand, the 
more revolutionary position: sharing what one doesn’t have is a truly 
beautiful declaration because it paints a picture of a lover who does not 
have to prove his love through objects of exchange (diamond rings, 
flowers, and so on), through the articulation of theories or philosophies, 
etc. Not at all! For the revolutionary lover it is quite the opposite, in fact: he 
shares precisely what he does not have, that is, what is impossible for 
him to share at all. The lover shares an impossibility, a miracle, which is 
itself a small revolution. It is only in this very refined sense that we can 
truly claim, as we so often do, that “anarchists make better lovers.” 
Does this not also point us toward the proper way to translate 
Richard J. F. Day’s very relevant ethics of “groundless solidarity?” Day’s 
anarchist ethical commitment should be read from within the framework 
of the ‘lack of an object’ (after all, his commitment in his 2005 book 
Gramsci is Dead was to a “Lacanian anarchism”). He defined his ethics in 
the following way: “groundless solidarity means seeing one’s own 
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privilege and oppression in the context of other privileges and 
oppressions, as so interlinked that no particular form of inequality – be it 
class, race, gender, sexuality, or ability – can be postulated as the central 
axis of struggle” (Day, 2005: 18). It is not that privilege (or lack thereof) 
should be the guide for serious revolutionary struggle but rather that the 
inner universal dimension of the objet petit a should be at the fore. In 
other words, we might think seriously about the famous lyric from the 
Canadian anarchist punk band Propagandhi: “I recognize one form of 
oppression and now I recognize the rest!” It is through an understanding 
that within each social monad there is something missing – within its 
symbolic system, within its very dictionary – that we might finally fashion 
for ourselves a possible way forward. It is not therefore for us to find a 
transversality across the mutliplicities but rather to find within each 
multiplicity a fundamental schism and to forge solidarity campaigns with 
those who, within each multiplicity, are exposing the determinations of 
the discourse. 
It is only when the objet a is moved from the place of the ‘non-part’ 
(to borrow Ranciere’s terms) as that which seeks incorporation into the 
body of knowledge or politics, toward, finally, the objet petit a as the agent 
of the discourse itself, that we can finally transition into the revolutionary 
analytic discourse. But this perhaps what Cohn & Colson explicitly wish to 
avoid (likely because of an inability to understand or render consistent the 
knowledge of any Lacanian intervention). The objet a must be fashioned 
into an object of philosophy – it must be fashioned into something 
intelligible and consistent – so that one can avoid a much more traumatic 
existential encounter with it. Colson writes that “[i]n the theory of desire as 
lack, the encounter with the other becomes impossible” (Colson, 2019: 
14). What we should notice here is that it is actually quite the opposite: in 
any other discourse, the encounter with the Other (written with a capital 
‘O’ to distinguish it from the little “other”) becomes impossible! It is only 
through the Lacanian intervention that one might form a true universality 
with others based upon the “loving” axiom that one gives what one does 
not have. In other words, it is because Lacanian theory begins by positing 
a fundamental problem or obstacle in the social relation (‘mutual 
recognition,’ as Cohn puts it) that we can, paradoxically, finally establish 
an authentic and more enduring social link. This is much more promising 
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that beginning with the position of the possibility of social relations only to 
suddenly realize, after all of that, that there are unconscious 
determinations precluded any such link. Colson opts for “analogy” to 
solve this problem. Cohn summarizes his position: 
Colson proposes the Proudhonian concept of ‘analogy’ as 
an alternative to the kind of reductive strategic analysis in 
which every form of power must ultimately be tracked 
back to a single source […] (Cohn, 2019: 8). 
Analogy is a strategy picked up also from Judith Butler – whose work 
similarly celebrates the endless sliding of S2s against the determinations 
of the master discourse, S1 – which attempts to find one that is “like” 
another, within a vast system of of consistent multiplicities. It is possible, 
they claim, to affirm some “like-ness,” some common ground, even while, 
fundamentally, avoiding the problematics of identity. But this is what we 
must very much not do: an identity is here nothing more than a concept, 
and the formulation of power discussed here presumes that the concept 
of identity asserts definitional power. Yet, it is because of this definitional 
power, within which we are all imprisoned and implicated, that we can 
even assert the lack or non-identity – the slippage of signifiers. Thus, there 
is a blind-spot here which remains unarticulated and which determines 
the discourse as if from behind. Alenka Zupančič points this out very well 
in her new book What IS Sex?, whereby she demonstrates that identities 
will never tame the objet petit a, and, moreover, it is because of the real 
disruptive force of the non-relation that identities/concepts are 
constructed at all. 
At times it even appears as though Gilles Deleuze, Daniel Colson, 
and Jesse Cohn are articulated a discourse which wishes to become that 
very blindspot. They wish to be capable of doing as the master does: 
taking a discourse from behind (S1 stands behind S2) and providing it 
with determinations which it did not consciously desire. In other words, 
the strategy of Deleuze and Colson is here reduced to intended to 
become the unconscious master of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon! We have to 
be very careful here because if the analogy of ‘taking a discourse from 
behind’ doesn’t render obvious what is at stake here – that is, a certain 
rape analogy – then it should be nonetheless clear that we wish to do 
away with precisely that type of aggression within anarchist thinking. 
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Incidentally, in another perverse twist, is it not the case that this is what 
Daniel Colson aims to do with Proudhon’s discourse? His is an attempt to 
rid Proudhon of everything despicable, everything deplorable, everything 
he which is in excess of Proudhon’s discourse – the objet petit a (e.g., 
misogyny, racism, and so on) – and to transform or translate his 
discourse, from behind, into what one finally fantasizes his discourse to 
precisely be able. This is an inadequate attempt to tame the objet a. 
There will always be another anarchist who will claim: “Yes, but still: 
Proudhon was immoral.” The attempt is therefore futile, and a wasted 
effort, and the only recourse will be further wasted efforts. 
At the same time, there is another perversity (structurally speaking). 
Cohn recommends not to take this approach (e.g., taking a philosopher 
from behind) even while he proclaims that this is what the post-
anarchists do: “post-anarchist” discourse is said to apply “corrective 
lenses” to “classical anarchism” through “French theory” (Cohn in Colson, 
2019: 9). And the anti-postanarchists maintain that the post-anarchists 
haven’t adequately understood the historical circumstances of anarchism 
(e.g., all of its rich ethnographic data, its references and resources, its 
diverse voices, and so on); in a word, it is a critique of post-anarchist 
theory for not engaging at the level of university discourse. Our response 
should be very direct: the anti-postanarchists care only about knowledge 
and therefore refuse fundamentally any actual experience. It is they, 
therefore, who are the true university scholars of the movement: the only 
way to include experience into a discourse is to recognize the important 
place of the objet petit a, an experience typically reserved for the clinic. 
We can see this fundamentally in Cohn’s assertion that “English-language 
works of postanarchism [mine included, no doubt] have not been deeply 
informed by the historical experience of anarchism. Relying on a few key 
thinkers taken as anarchist counterparts to Marx and Engels, as filtered 
through certain dominant interpretations of those thinkers’ texts, the 
anglophone postanarchists have too often been content to ignore a 
plethora of other anarchist voices (including the voices of women, non-
Europeans, and anybody from the post-World War II generation […]” 
(Cohn in Colson, 2019: 9). 
Here, my reply should suffice to demonstrate the perversity of this 
very ironic formulation: ‘welcome, Jesse Cohn and Daniel Colson, to the 
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camp of the post-anarchists!’ On the one hand, it is that which you deny 
that you are here more fully coming having to reckon with: in the charge 
that the post-anarchists are too scholarly, the work of the anti-
postanarchists reveals itself as even more scholarly! Here, the little 
dictionary on anarchist philosophy demonstrates, paradoxically, that it 
cannot avoid doing precisely what the post-anarchists are apparently 
doing (for example: the book focuses only on Pierre-Joseph Proudhon 
and Gilles Deleuze, both are French theorists, and barely even mentions 
Mikhail Bakunin, and other voices; it certainly does not provide any 
engagement with the voices of women, non-Europeans and so on, 
except, finally, as filtered through the ideological lenses of anarchism). I 
am tempted to ask what might happen if the voices of women, people of 
colour, refugees, and so on, were, in fact included within the volume? 
What we would find is that they were not all that the fantasy had cracked 
them up to be: what if they are voices – such as I hear from many of my 
close refugee and Muslim colleagues, brothers/sisters, and friends – that 
that critique and want to do away entirely with anarchist doctrine for 
being blasphemous? In other words, what if, as Freud boldly proclaimed 
more than a decade ago, the neighbour or other is here fundamentally a 
‘non-idealized’ who provokes the consistency of our discourse? 
The only revolution offered by Cohn & Colson is therefore full 
integration into university discourse, and yet this nonetheless is 
impossible anyway (indeed, this impossibility is what sustains the 
discourse, keeps it moving within its endless cycle of scholarship). It is not 
therefore that the post-anarchists are at fault (I am, nonetheless, an 
anarchist studies scholar) for working within the university, even though 
there is a sense in which there is a moral problem with working within the 
University for many anarchists. Quite the opposite: the post-anarchists are 
active in making interventions at the level of discourse, which, inevitably, 
produce very real effects in the world. This is quite different from a 
discourse which celebrates “an infinite capacity to interpret and 
reinterpret the signification of events and facts” (Judith Butler in Colson, 
2019: 15), or S2  a. Anarchist discourse should not today aim “to 
demonstrate the possible (and paradoxical) theoretical coherence of a 
movement that resolutely calls for anarchy” (Colson, 2019: 20) but rather it 
should go much further and be much more courageous. Beyond false 
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moral outrage and appeals to knowledge or historical depth, anarchist 
discourse today will need to find a significant way to pose a challenge to 
the master discourse. It remains my contention that Lacanian 
psychoanalysis is the only way forward. 
 
 
